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Abstract
Public and private investments in plant breeding have a proven track record of increasing agricultural
productivity, significantly contributing to economic well-being or social welfare. Substantial investments in
research and development are required before a new plant variety can be developed and released, which the
private sector can only recoup through commercial sales coupled with property rights. We previously
published outcomes from economic modeling implementing different categories and hypothetical variants of
intellectual property protection (IPP) in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology. Our goal here is to
portray these outcomes using examples that will be more immediately familiar to the plant-breeding and
policy-making communities. In so doing, we do not add to the analyses and arguments already presented. Our
objective here is to make more accessible to a broader audience subject matter already presented in a more
formal economic format by Lence et al. (2015). We found that plant variety protection (PVP) and utility
patents played important and complementary roles in promoting and adopting innovation. Voluntary
licensing under patents had a major contribution to social welfare. Periods of protection longer than the
current life span of a utility patent did not contribute maximally to the stock of social welfare. We performed a
reality check comparing different types of innovation and assessment of time and risk to commercialization.
We hope that this information can contribute to more effective implementation of IPP to further promote
genetic gain and thus enable commercially funded plant breeders to maximally contribute to the benefit of
society on a global basis.
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ABSTRACT 20 
Public and private investments in plant breeding have a proven track record of increasing 21 
agricultural productivity and thereby significantly contributing to economic well-being or social 22 
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welfare. Substantial investments in Research and Development (R&D) are required before a new 23 
plant variety can be developed and released, which the private sector can only recoup through 24 
commercial sales coupled with property rights. We previously published outcomes from 25 
economic modelling, implementing different categories and hypothetical variants of Intellectual 26 
Property Protection (IPP) in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology. Our goal here is to 27 
portray these outcomes in a manner and using examples that will be more immediately familiar 28 
to the plant breeding and policy making communities. We found that Plant Variety Protection 29 
(PVP) and utility patents played important and complementary roles in promoting and adopting 30 
innovation. Voluntary licensing under patents had a major contribution to social welfare. Periods 31 
of protection much longer than the current life-span of a utility patent did not contribute 32 
maximally to the stock of social welfare. We performed a reality check comparing different 33 
types of innovation and assessment of time/risk to commercialization. We hope that this 34 
information can contribute to more effective implementation of IPP to further promote genetic 35 
gain and thus enable commercially funded plant breeders to maximally contribute to the benefit 36 
of society on a global basis. 37 
Introduction 38 
Public and private investments in plant breeding have a proven track record of increasing 39 
agricultural productivity and thereby significantly contributing to economic well-being (Fehr 40 
1984; Frisvold et al., 1999; Duvick, 2005; Rubenstein et al., 2005; British Society of Plant 41 
Breeders, 2010). The application of intellectual property protection (IPP) in the field of plant 42 
breeding and biotechnology is an issue of abiding interest to many including those in academia, 43 
business, private and public sector research, policy makers, and non-governmental organizations 44 
(NGOs). For example, see Leskien and Flitner (1997), Bioversity International (1999), Cohen 45 
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(2000), Rai and Mauria (2004), UPOV (2005), Llewelyn and Adcock (2006), World Bank 46 
(2006), Wright (2006), Tripp et al. (2007), Louwaars et al. (2009), SGRP (2010), Dutfield 47 
(2011), UN HRC (2011), Blakeney (2012), ISF (2012), JIC (2012), Lieberherr and Meienberg 48 
(2014). 49 
Means to Obtain IPP in Plant Breeding and Biotechnology  50 
There are four major approaches that plant breeders can use to obtain IPP. These are: 1) 51 
contracts, 2) trade secrets, 3) Plant Variety Protection (PVP) or Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR), 52 
and 4) Utility Patents. The United States also provides PVP-type protection for varieties of 53 
asexually reproducing non-tuberous species through the 1930 US Plant Patent Act (35 U.S.C.§§ 54 
161-164). Contracts include bag-tag “shrink-wrap” type protection or use in contractually 55 
“closed-loop” systems. Trade secrets can help provide protection, particularly for parent lines of 56 
hybrids. The biology of hybrids also encourages farmers to annually purchase new seed because 57 
the harvested seed is a result of one generation of inbreeding which reduces yield potential.   58 
           Under the 1995 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), member 59 
countries may exclude plants and animals from patentability. For example, utility patents on 60 
plant varieties per se are not available in the European Union (EU) although utility patents 61 
around genetically modified traits and native traits are possible in that region. Countries that 62 
exclude plants from patentability are obliged by their membership of the World Trade 63 
Organisation (WTO) to provide an effective sui generis IPP system; e.g., PVP. WTO members 64 
may also exclude “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” from 65 
patentability. PVP is a sui generis form of protection prescribed by the L’Union internationale 66 
pour la protection des obtentions végétales (UPOV). As of June 2015, there were 72 UPOV 67 
members (UPOV, 2015); two of which (the EU and the African Intellectual Property 68 
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Organization [OAPI]) are intergovernmental organizations (UPOV, 69 
2014)(http://www.upov.int/members/en/). In addition to PVP Acts that are sanctioned as 70 
compliant with UPOV, other countries either have, or are in the process of enacting variety 71 
protection laws, some of which may or may not be UPOV-compliant (e.g., Plant Protection 72 
Variety and Farmers Rights Act of India).  73 
           The two most recent UPOV Conventions are dated 1978 and 1991, although new 74 
members can only join under the 1991 Convention. The primary differences between the two 75 
Conventions are that UPOV 1991 additionally: 1) extends to all varieties and species, 2) prevents 76 
others from producing, reproducing, or conditioning for the purpose of propagation, importing, 77 
exporting, stocking, and offering for sale, 3) introduction of the concept of an Essentially 78 
Derived Variety (EDV) where IPP ownership resides with the breeder of the initial variety, 4) 79 
optional farmers exception only for use on same farm and may be subject to license fee; private 80 
use and research allowable; 5) 5 years extension of duration of protection, and 6) double 81 
protection by both PVP and patents allowed (Dodds et al., 2007). 82 
(.http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch04/p06/. Accessed Aug 13
th
 2015. 83 
Patent laws may be country or regionally specific. In some countries and regions plant 84 
varieties per se (e.g., Europe) are not patentable, whereas in others, including Australia, Canada, 85 
and the United States, they are. Nonetheless, even if plant varieties per se are not allowable as 86 
patentable subject matter, methods of breeding, production, harvested material, native or 87 
genetically modified traits may remain eligible as patentable subject matter. Further variations in 88 
country or regional patent law can also include exceptions. For example, patent laws 89 
implemented in France and Germany have exceptions to allow further breeding with a variety 90 
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that has a patented trait, including commercialization of a progeny variety provided that patented 91 
traits have been removed. In contrast, US patent law has no such exceptions.  92 
Eligibility for utility patent protection requires evidence of i) utility, ii) novelty, iii) “non-93 
obviousness” i.e., include an inventive step beyond that which could be conceived by a person 94 
having “ordinary skill in the art”, and iv) enablement, (i.e., described to allow the invention to be 95 
recreated for observation and evaluation with regard to the patent per se). Complete written 96 
descriptions are not possible for plant varieties so enablement is established through a seed 97 
deposit maintained by an appropriate depository such as the American Type Tissue Culture 98 
Collection. It is important to understand that a deposit of biological material is “not a grant of 99 
license… to infringe the patent” and “the release of biological material from the depository to 100 
others does not grant them a license to infringe the patent” (Harney and McBride, 2007). 101 
Patentable subject matter is provided into the public domain at the expiration of the protection 102 
period as a “pact with society” in return for the grant of limited exclusivity by the patent holder 103 
(Comments, 2007). For further details on exclusions from patentability including country status 104 
see http://tinyurl.com/d5knqoo. More complete reviews of IPP methods are provided by 105 
Williams and Weber (1989), Jondle (1993), Hayes and Riley (2002), Krattiger (2004), Le 106 
Buanec (2004), CAMBIA (undated) available at 107 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/1234.html, and Pardey et al. (2013). The International 108 
Seed Federation recently completed a revision of its position on IP (ISF, 2012). Helfer (2004) 109 
provides comprehensive information describing international legal regimes and policy options 110 
for intellectual property rights in plants. 111 
Previous Economics Based Analyses of IPP Systems in Plant Breeding 112 
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Substantial investments in R&D are required before a new variety can be developed and released 113 
(Evenson, 1989; Evenson and Gollin, 1997) which the private sector can only ultimately recoup 114 
through commercialization and property rights. Kolady and Lesser (2009) and Naseem et al. 115 
(2005) found that privately funded PVP’d wheat varieties grown in Washington State and PVP’d 116 
US cotton varieties, respectively contributed to improved productivity. In the U.S., PVP may 117 
have stimulated public, but not private sector investments in wheat breeding (Alston and Venner, 118 
2002). There was no evidence that privately funded PVP’d wheat varieties had stimulated 119 
increased genetic gain in US wheat production (Alston and Venner, 2002). A relative lack of 120 
incentives for private sector wheat breeding in the U.S. is likely associated with the lack of any 121 
requirement in the US PVP Act for PVP holders to recoup royalties for use of farm saved seed. 122 
For example, the replanting  and “brown bagging” of seed harvested from PVP’d self-pollinated 123 
varieties of wheat, without royalty payment contributed to the exit of much of private industry 124 
from hard red wheat breeding in the U.S. (Grace, 2008). During 1990, both Pioneer and Cargill 125 
discontinued breeding of hard red winter wheat in the U.S. because production and sales were 126 
not profitable: Pioneer donated wheat germplasm to Kansas State University which represented 127 
the culmination of 20 years of privately funded research (Knight-Ridder, 1990).  The USDA 128 
Wheat Baseline, 2008-17 updated March 12, 2008 said: “The pace of genetic improvement has 129 
been slower for wheat than for some other field crops, resulting in little growth in wheat yields. 130 
Genetic improvement for wheat has been slower because of genetic complexity and because of 131 
lower potential returns to commercial seed companies, factors that discourage investment in 132 
research.” In contrast, Hayes et al. (2009) showed a positive effect of PVP for genetic gains in 133 
UK and French wheat production as a result of privately funded breeding when associated with 134 
royalty payments by farmers when harvested seed of protected varieties was used to sow the next 135 
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season’s crop. Likewise, Alston et al. (2012) suggested that Australia’s end-point royalties 136 
system had increased private sector investment in breeding. ISF date showed higher sustained 137 
wheat yields for countries where private sector wheat breeding is a competitive business (France, 138 
Germany, U.K.) compared to countries where wheat breeding remains largely in the public 139 
domain (Argentina, Australia, Uruguay, United States).  Swanson and Goeschl (2005) showed 140 
that hybridity had a similar result as effective IPP on increased productivity as a result of 141 
privately funded breeding. Kolady et al. (2012) showed that yield trends in India for maize and 142 
pearl millet had outpaced those for the development of self-pollinated varieties of rice and wheat. 143 
Lence and Hayes (2005) showed that R&D firms had reduced incentives to develop technologies 144 
for use in other countries where they can be easily adopted as a result of non-existent or 145 
ineffective IPP. They concluded that effective IPP in both countries would allow firms to 146 
conduct relevant research in each country. This conclusion has particular relevance to the field of 147 
plant breeding and agriculture where there is a very large element of genotype x environmental 148 
interaction thereby placing a premium on research and development being conducted in situ. 149 
Hayes et al. (2009) showed a positive association between strength of IPP and rate of genetic 150 
gain. Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) showed that when research was risky or expensive, then an 151 
IPP system with a research and commercialization exception would undermine incentives to 152 
undertake that type of research.  153 
Use of Modelling 154 
A modelling approach is customary where experimental approaches are impractical, very 155 
expensive, lengthy, or impossible. Modelling facilitates an understanding of complex 156 
interactions, can identify “best management” practices, and study long-term effects of 157 
undertaking various options. Models can provide predictions and improved understanding 158 
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(Thornton and Herrero, 2001; 2008). Modelling is not a substitute for research-based enquiry; 159 
rather it is an integral component of developing hypotheses for further testing. Modelling has 160 
been widely used in helping to research the physiology and genetics of complex traits in maize 161 
(Tuberosa, 2012; Shekoofa et al., 2014), and formed the basis for developing hybrids with 162 
improved native-trait based drought resistance (Cooper et al., 2014). Economists have also used 163 
modelling to investigate the attributes of various IPP systems (Lence et al., 2015). Nonetheless, a 164 
combination of IPP subject-matter and usage of a highly mathematical language may lead to a 165 
degree of opaqueness, especially to those engaged in other fields of endeavor. Consequently, 166 
practitioners in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology may prefer a more accessible 167 
description of the IPP economics studies, results, and conclusions. The objective of this paper is 168 
therefore to describe recent IPP economics research (Lence et al., 2015) in a way that can allow a 169 
greater understanding and basis for further enquiry for those interested in IPP with regard to 170 
plant breeding and biotechnology.  171 
Research Methodology: The Conceptual Framework 172 
The two most widely available approaches used by plant breeders to obtain IPP are PVP and 173 
utility patents and these were chosen as the main pillars of the model. Of these, PVP is the most 174 
used by plant breeders globally to protect varieties per se. On a practical basis, these two forms 175 
of IPP were chosen as pillars of the model primarily because of the large differences in 176 
protection and dissemination of the protected material afforded under each system (Table 1). 177 
Establishment of a model built upon the framework of two very different approaches to IPP 178 
provided a breadth of scope where outcomes of contrasting models, e.g., with different durations 179 
of protection, or with different periods under which breeder exception might apply, could also be 180 
investigated.  181 
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Describing the Model 182 
Each of several plant breeding companies optimizes its research program based on the strength 183 
and length of IPP. Every firm can capture the benefits resulting from its own research in the 184 
period after it was undertaken. In subsequent periods, firms continue to conduct research, and the 185 
productivity of this research is determined in part by the amount of research conducted in the 186 
previous or prior periods. With utility patents, a firm may be prevented from accessing 187 
competitor research in subsequent periods until the patent protection expires, whereas under PVP 188 
alone firms have access to the commercial products resulting from other firms’ research. Firms 189 
anticipate this trade-off between strength of their own IPP and accessibility to others’ 190 
innovations when making their research investment decisions. We then introduced modifications 191 
to these basic models and made additional comparisons to provide a more comprehensive 192 
investigation of the components affecting IPP and the resultant development and spread of 193 
benefits (social welfare) in the form of improved agricultural production achieved via genetic 194 
gain. 195 
The Costs of Acquiring Genetic Stocks 196 
In this model, the costs of acquiring genetic stocks must be taken into consideration. The costs of 197 
acquiring events for development of GMO-traited varieties follows a similar logic although these 198 
will include not only development costs, but also regulatory costs. The possible sources of 199 
genetic stocks, native traits, or GMO traits are i) the firm’s own genetic stocks, ii) genetic stocks 200 
developed by other firms if available, and iii) other more exotic and less immediately well 201 
adapted germplasm, including the development of new transgenic events sourced from other 202 
species or genera. If protection is under PVP alone then the commercialized genetic stocks of 203 
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one firm are available to others for breeding during the commercial life of the variety with 204 
commercial rights available to the second breeder, unless under UPOV 1991 that second variety 205 
is essentially derived. Also, under PVP, it is the policy of the USDA to make publicly available 206 
parental lines of hybrids at the end of their PVP period. These inbreds are then available in the 207 
global public domain via distribution by the National Plant Germplasm System (NPGS). Such 208 
provision of access following expiration of PVP is not the mandate of UPOV, nor is it the 209 
practice of most other countries.  210 
Under protection by utility patents, there is a period of exclusivity (20 years from filing in 211 
most countries) during which time the owner can restrict research and commercial use by others 212 
or can grant specific forms of use via licensing agreements. At the expiration of patent 213 
protection, the variety is available in the public domain. However, where off-patent subject 214 
matter includes genes or varieties that remain subject to regulatory requirements then those 215 
requirements will still need to be satisfied. In the United States, there is a voluntary agreement 216 
and process in place (the AgAccord) (http://www.agaccord.org/) to facilitate the continuance of 217 
regulatory requirements post-patent although significant costs will be involved to maintain 218 
regulatory approvals, especially on an international basis (Jefferson et al., 2015).  219 
Other potential sources of genetic stocks include accessions conserved ex situ in 220 
genebanks or found in situ either under cultivation or as wild or weedy species. Many genebank 221 
accessions can be accessed from the US NPGS or from other genebanks including those of the 222 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) such as the International 223 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), the International Rice Research Institute 224 
(IRRI), and the International Center for research in the Semi-Arid Tropics ( ICRISAT) each 225 
make materials available through a multilateral system using the standard Material Transfer 226 
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Agreement (sMTA) of the International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 227 
Agriculture (IT-PGRFA). Contractual terms in the present sMTA are currently under review by 228 
the Governing Body of the Treaty. Nonetheless, significant improvements remain to be made 229 
regarding accessibility of germplasm from genebanks. Bjornstad et al. (2013) reported that of 230 
seed requests sent to 121 countries, seeds were received from only 44 (36%). Additional 231 
germplasm may be available on a bilateral basis once countries have implemented biodiversity 232 
laws under the auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  233 
There are usually considerable technical challenges that must be met before exotic 234 
germplasm can be practically useful in a plant breeding program. Material may not be well 235 
characterized making choice of accessions an immediate challenge. Exotic germplasm is usually 236 
not well adapted to grow or even to set seed in a different target production environment (TPE). 237 
Consequently, years of adaptation and pre-breeding may be required before any potential for 238 
improving the already widely-used genepool can be ascertained. The costs of accessing and 239 
using genetic stocks increase as the amount, time, and risk level of research increases. These 240 
costs decrease as the supply of genetic stocks increases, the stocks become better characterized 241 
and adapted, and they become nearer in the research and development “pipeline” to commercial 242 
release. Sourcing options in order from least to most risky or expensive include, i) a firm’s own 243 
germplasm and thus freely available, ii) germplasm available from others e.g., sourcing 244 
commercially available varieties that are not protected by utility patents  including via the 245 
breeder exception of PVP, following the expiration of utility patent protection, or following 246 
expiration of PVP in circumstances where parental lines are made publicly available (e.g. as 247 
practiced in the U.S. but not generally so elsewhere), iii) via licensing, iv) via a genebank, a 248 
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prebreeding consortium, or v) from an in situ location (e.g., on farm or wild and assuming all 249 
access and benefit sharing responsibilities have been met..  250 
The Measure of Success 251 
The metric used for measuring success as a result of plant breeding was optimal genetic 252 
innovation which we equated with optimal social welfare. We made this connection on the basis 253 
that improvement of agricultural production through genetic gain and the improved protection of 254 
that genetic potential in the face of biotic and abiotic stresses is basic to public policies that seek 255 
to improve social welfare as a result of improved health and nutrition of consumers.  256 
Results from Modeling 257 
Two Key Parameters 258 
Results were sensitive to two key parameters. The first was parameter γ, which measured the 259 
degree to which previous genetic research reduced the cost of, or levered, the ability to obtain 260 
genetic improvements in a particular period. Projects that required a high degree of prior 261 
research had a high value for γ. Intuitively, γ can also be understood as a measure of the degree 262 
of research complexity. The second key parameter was (1 − ρ), the rate at which genetic 263 
improvements depreciated. Comparisons of various IPP approaches will be presented in the text. 264 
Readers who might also like to review results figuratively are directed to Lence et al. (2015).  265 
Comparing PVP and Patents 266 
PVP and patents were complimentary in their potential contributions to genetic gain and social 267 
welfare. Patents provided more potential for higher optimal genetic innovation than PVP due to 268 
the ability of patent holders to prevent unlicensed access for further breeding and commercial use 269 
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during patent life. In contrast, PVP provided a moderate level of optimal genetic innovation 270 
coupled with faster horizontal spread of innovation among companies via the breeder exception. 271 
Under PVP, commercialization of new varieties is only limited under UPOV 1991, and then only 272 
when a derivative inbred line or variety which has met DUS requirements is also then 273 
determined to be essentially derived. Breeding and commercial development under the breeder 274 
exception of UPOV of PVP is an example of the horizontal diffusion of research results 275 
(Swanson and Goeschl 2005). Thus, PVP allows short- lived commercial varieties to achieve 276 
genetic gain and contributes to social welfare by ensuring that these varieties reach as many 277 
other breeders as possible even before protection on these varieties expires.  278 
Changing the Length of Utility Patent Protection 279 
Patent terms usually run for 20 years. Lence et al. (2005) had previously shown that, in terms of 280 
optimizing social welfare, there was an optimum patent life with regard to the contribution of 281 
plant breeding, of just longer than the 20 tear term. Extending the term of patent life much 282 
further than the 20 year protection period began to undermine overall contributions to social 283 
welfare because of a reduction of timely diffusion into the public domain. When shorter patent 284 
terms were investigated, a protection period of 10 years contributed more to social welfare than 285 
did a 5 year period of protection unless there was an extremely rapid depreciation rate for the 286 
innovation coupled with a low degree of specialization or research complexity (γ).  287 
The Effect of Reducing the Time Needed to Create a Variety under PVP 288 
Except for scenarios with low research complexity (γ) or high depreciation rates (1 − ρ), a 289 
reduction in PVP time reduced welfare and genetic gain. This was because firms would know 290 
that their competitors would be able to build upon their research program at an earlier date, and 291 
thus reduced their incentive to undertake risk during research. Reducing the time to generate a 292 
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new variety accelerated diffusion of that new variety and thus the PVP system with shorter 293 
protection period led to greater genetic gain or social welfare in circumstances where varieties 294 
had a short shelf life. The base case PVP with a longer protection time led to increased genetic 295 
gain and more social welfare when specialization was important and for long-lived varieties.  296 
        All things being equal, the completion of more breeding cycles per unit time should be 297 
expected to contribute positively to genetic gain, and thus to social welfare. However, if reduced 298 
cycle times become associated predominantly or only with breeding strategies that make 299 
relatively minor genetic changes using only well-adapted germplasm then there could be risks of 300 
narrowing the widely-used and well-adapted gene pool and so reducing medium-longer-term 301 
potential to increase productivity.  302 
The Effect of a Prolonged Period (Beyond Current PVP and Patent Terms) of Prohibition 303 
of Public Access 304 
Potentially, when maintained as a trade secret competitors can never access the original science 305 
whereas utility patents allow for inventions to be available to the public once the patent term 306 
expires. Even when hybrids are protected solely by PVP, the preference is to breed using 307 
parental lines per se in order to develop next cycle inbreds with predictable combinations to 308 
maximize hybrid vigor. However, most countries implement PVP, with the notable exception of 309 
the U.S. in a way that allows owners of parental lines to maintain those lines as trade secrets 310 
beyond the life of PVP protection. In contrast, the U.S. implements PVP by releasing parental 311 
inbred lines into the public domain at the expiration of their PVP via the USDA National Plant 312 
Germplasm System (NPGS). Varieties and inbred lines protected by utility patents are also 313 
available to the public following expiration of patent protection. 314 
Page 14 of 30
5585 Guilford Rd., Madison WI 53711
Crop Science
For  Review Only
15 
 
          There was a large set of research complexity (γ) and depreciation combinations where 315 
patents with a specific termination date contributed more to social welfare compared to trade 316 
secrets with protection lasting well beyond a regular patent term. IPP afforded by utility patents 317 
and PVP as implemented in the U.S., which provides inventions into the public domain at the 318 
expiration of their IPP term(s), added more to social welfare than if firms were instead to use a 319 
policy of prolonged trade secrets. Use of utility patents also facilitated licensing. Licensing was 320 
less feasible, if not impractical, with trade secrets as the sole form of protection. 321 
Use of Utility Patents with Licensing  322 
Licensing increased genetic gain and social welfare for a large set of research complexity (γ) and 323 
depreciation combinations. Licensing allowed society to more quickly access new inventions in a 324 
similar fashion to PVP, but, unlike PVP a system of patents with licensing provided greater 325 
rewards to the firm that created the technology by way of license fees and the firm’s ability to 326 
restrict use by others during the patent term. Patents plus licensing maintained an incentive to 327 
conduct research of a long-term and specialized nature, while also allowing that research to be 328 
quickly disseminated. However, if licensing were to be mandatory then the benefits afforded by 329 
patent rights in stimulating innovation could be undermined  330 
Validation 331 
In order to better understand the size of research complexity (γ) for a range of different 332 
improvements,  two seed research firms were asked to rank various genetic improvements with 333 
respect to their interpretation of this parameter. We approached the issue of research complexity 334 
in a context understandable to plant breeders by asking them to describe each type of 335 
improvement as a proportion of the time and cost involved in incorporating exotic germplasm 336 
into maize. This approach respected business confidential information and could be used as an 337 
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exemplar or index because it represented a complex breeding program that employees at each 338 
company had prior experience. The transition from research complexity to a time and cost index 339 
is fairly intuitive. For example, projects that take 15 years to develop will typically have a longer 340 
expected commercial life compared with projects that take only 5 years to develop. If this were 341 
not the case then the firm would not undertake the multiyear investment. 342 
Survey results are shown in Table 2. Results suggested that single-gene backcrossing and 343 
traditional breeding programs were activities with low research complexity (γ). Second-344 
generation transgenes and the introduction of exotic germplasm had much greater research 345 
complexity. An IPP system that favored highly complex research was therefore more likely to 346 
provide a sufficient level of IPP to support commercial research and development programs such 347 
as those involving second generation transgenes or the incorporation of exotic germplasm. 348 
Discussion 349 
A modelling approach to research is widely used in numerous fields, including plant breeding 350 
and agriculture (Hammer et al., 2006). Modelling allows many permutations to be tested and can 351 
help identify important parameters and show the results of their interactions. Modelling can 352 
provide useful hypotheses which can then be further tested. One well-respected plant breeder 353 
cautioned that with modelling you get the results according to how the model was programed at 354 
the beginning. One good test of the results of modelling is to compare results with intuitive 355 
knowledge gained from practical experience. The reality check provided by two companies for 356 
different elements of research also aligned with these results.  357 
Results from an earlier study into the outcomes of applying IPP in plant breeding (Lence 358 
et al., 2005) indicated that 1) there was an optimum life of patent protection and 2) identified 359 
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major beneficiaries of research and innovation in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology. 360 
Briefly, Lence et al. (2005) found that 1) IPP was necessary to encourage private breeding 361 
companies to invest in research that would provide farmers with the best seed technology, 2) 362 
There was an optimum duration of protection in relation to the contribution of innovation in 363 
plant breeding research and product development to social welfare of just over 20 years, 3) 364 
Benefits from higher and better quality yields were captured by farmers through reduced 365 
production costs per unit harvested, 4) A multiplicity of benefits ultimately flowed to consumers 366 
contributed by a) better quality food supporting human health, b) yield gains lowering the price 367 
of harvested produce, and c) yield gains which offered the potential to take less productive or 368 
more fragile lands out of agricultural production thereby supporting biodiversity and enabling a 369 
cleaner environment. 370 
Our results were in agreement with the discussion provided in Pardey et al. (2013) and 371 
with theoretical results derived in Moschini and Yerokhin (2008). Each of the two primary IPP 372 
systems has been shown to have advantages and disadvantages, and neither of them is better than 373 
the other under all possible circumstances. Unlike the two earlier papers, the model used here 374 
had enough structure to describe the specific parametric conditions under which one IPP system 375 
dominated the other; i.e. performed better in terms of encouraging greater genetic gain or 376 
contribution to social welfare. We were also able to consider subtle changes such as licensing 377 
and changes in the effective length of IPP and to show how these altered the outcomes in terms 378 
of genetic gain or contribution to social welfare. 379 
The results of some comparisons were clear from the modelling results reported initially 380 
by Lence et al. (2015) and presented in a revised format here. For example, patents were more 381 
appropriate when longer term and riskier research was needed. However, much of the research 382 
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conducted by plant breeders is diverse and subject to several interactions including degree of 383 
specialization, half-life of a new product, available resources, research, and business strategies. 384 
There are also implications of interactions of IPP with the stage of technology development and 385 
level of understanding of the genetic basis of important agronomic traits. For example, use of 386 
double-haploids, off-season nurseries, and molecular marker data can facilitate access to both 387 
widely used, well-adapted germplasm and to more exotic landrace germplasm especially 388 
provided the genetic control and chromosomal locations of the traits of interest are known 389 
(Tanksley and McCouch, 1997; Glaszmann et al., 2010; Lubberstedt, 2011; Kilian and Graner, 390 
2012; Dhanapal and Govindaraj, 2015).  391 
There are different fits for IPP according to different research strategies and different 392 
sized, or resource based companies. It is not surprising therefore, that with such dynamic 393 
complexity there is no “one-size” or “one-type” IPP that can best fit all circumstances. It is clear, 394 
however, that the ability to choose from a range of different specific IPP instruments can allow 395 
more opportunities for increased genetic gain and thus contribute more to social welfare than to 396 
foster IPP reliance upon trade secrets alone. Furthermore, choice or availability of IPP systems 397 
can influence the kind of research that is done. In addition, the ability to invoke exceptions under 398 
PVP and utility patents provides countries opportunities for flexibility in implementation. 399 
Providing breeders and biotechnologists with a wide range of choice reduces the potential 400 
dangers of imposing a relatively low ceiling on innovations developed in country. Providing 401 
incentives to develop new varieties in country is particularly important in the fields of plant 402 
breeding and agriculture because of highly significant genotype x environment effects 403 
determining agronomic performance.  404 
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For maximum benefit of society with regard to contributions that can be made by the 405 
commercial plant breeding sector an optimum balance is required to be struck between 406 
encouraging and disseminating innovation. We hope that by achieving a more complete 407 
understanding of the parameters affecting IPP, their interactions, and their overall effects on 408 
genetic gain, will help provide means to create IPP environments that can contribute further to 409 
increased social welfare achieved through research and innovation-based plant breeding and 410 
biotechnology.  411 
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Table1. Main features distinguishing Plant Variety Protection (PVP) implemented according to UPOV 
1991 and Utility Patents. 
 PVP Utility Patents 
Eligibility Criteria        Distinctness, Uniformity, Stability 
(DUS)               
Novelty, Innovative, Enabled, 
Useful 
Protection 20 years, can vary according to 
crop.  
 
Others cannot copy for 
commercial use.  
 
Others cannot repeatedly use for 
direct commercial use.  
 
Harvested seed cannot be sold 
for resowing.                                                          
20 years 
 
No commercial use unless 
licensed by owner 
Exceptions                  Commercial variety can be used 
to breed and commercialize a 
new variety unless it is 
Essentially Derived. 
 
Harvested seed can be used for 
resowing own holding; royalties 
may be required. 
For countries that allow utility 
patents on inbred lines or 
varieties per se there are no 
breeder exceptions. For trait 
patents, some countries allow 
breeding but not 
commercialization of the 
patented trait 
Seed deposits            Not available for public use 
during life of protection.  
 
Not required by UPOV to be 
placed into the public domain 
although it is policy of USDA to 
make publicly available. 
Made available upon issuance of 
patent. However, the deposit is 
“not a grant of license…to 
infringe the patent” (Harney and 
McBride, 2007). Available in the 
public domain at the expiration 
of protection. 
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Table 2. Time to Product Commercialization for Different Types of Genetic Improvements 
Genetic Improvements Index Time to Product Commervialization
8
 (0-1) 
• Single gene backcrossed into elite material 
• Single gene backcrossed into elite recurrent 
parent. Example would be converting line to 
glyphosate resistance 
• Common breeding program Elite x Elite 
• Germplasm enhancement Exotic x Elite 
• Develop second-generation transgenes + 
regulatory 
• No public program. Company works through 
un-adapted germplasm to identify trait of 
interest Exotic x Exotic 
 0.300  
 0.300  
   
   
 0.375  
 0.650  
 0.778  
   
 1.000  
8
The index measure time to commercialization relative to time to develop the improvement. 
Page 30 of 30
5585 Guilford Rd., Madison WI 53711
Crop Science
